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Many laws address deception. Familiar examples include:
the torts of deceit, libel and defamation; the crime of theft by
false pretenses and federal mail and wire fraud statutes; the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Lanham Act, and state
unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws; laws prohibiting
securities fraud and requiring issuer disclosures; the contract
defense of misrepresentation; and the law of perjury. Less
familiar examples include the Organic Food Production Act of
1990, which prohibits misleading uses of “organic” on food
labels; 1 the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which provides for civil
and criminal penalties against those who pass off goods as
Indian products; 2 section 340 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which provides for the
denaturalization of individuals whose citizenship was procured

* Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. I am grateful for feedback from participants at the Rothgerber
Constitutional Law Conference at the University of Colorado School of Law in
April 2017, as well as comments from Ann Lipton and Justin Marceau. The paper
also benefited greatly from my participation in the Deception Roundtable
organized by Woodrow Hartzog and Mark McKenna and sponsored by the
University of Notre Dame Law School in May 2016.
1. Organic Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–24 (1990).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2010).
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by concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation; 3
and section 508 of the Communications Act of 1934, which
makes it a federal crime to rig a game show. 4
Although these laws are rarely studied or taught together,
they collectively constitute a coherent body. The law of
deception, as I use the term, comprises laws that regulate the
flow of information to prevent or remedy dishonesty,
disinformation, artifice, cover-up, and other forms of trickery,
as well as wrongfully caused mistakes, misunderstandings,
miscalculations, and other types of false belief. 5 On that
definition, the law of deception includes more than laws
addressing lies and other misrepresentations. Falsehoods are
but one way that a person can cause a false belief in another.
Thus false advertising law recognizes that a literally truthful
advertisement can cause consumers to draw false inferences;
tort law recognizes that concealing a fact can be as wrongful as
lying about it; and disclosure duties recognize that the failure
to act can also cause false beliefs in others. The law of
deception includes these and other laws that target deceptive
acts and omissions.
This Essay argues that legal scholars and jurists would do
well to think about the law of deception as a whole. 6 My claim
is not that the law of deception is one single thing. I doubt that
there is a master principle or purpose that runs through all
laws that target deceptive behavior. 7 But one finds a
constellation of design problems and theoretical questions
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1952). But see Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1918, 1930–31 (2017) (resolving an interpretive question and holding that false
statements must directly lead to naturalization to be a basis for conviction).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1934).
5. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100
GEO. L.J. 449, 449–50 (2012).
6. For two important recent works in the area, see EDWARD J. BALLEISEN,
FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM BARNUM TO MADOFF 179 (2017) and SEANA
VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY AND THE LAW
(2014).
7. The same might be said of other areas of law commonly treated as unified
wholes. The law of contracts covers everything from informal transactions
between family members to employment agreements to highly negotiated longterm supply agreements between multinational corporations. There is little
reason to think that the social interest in enforcement is the same across such
different transactions. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE
THEORY OF CONTRACTS (2017). And yet one learns something by thinking about
the law of contract as a whole—even if part of the lesson is about differences
within the category.
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reappearing throughout the category. A syncretic approach
illuminates characteristic challenges lawmakers face when
designing laws of deception, the range of design solutions to
them, and the social and political interests that legal
regulation of deceptive behavior implicates.
The bulk of this Essay, comprising Parts II and III,
describes four clusters of issues that reappear across the law of
deception. The first, which is the focus of Part II, concerns
rules of interpretation. Before a fact finder can determine
whether a statement is false, she must interpret what it
means. Different laws of deception incorporate different rules
of interpretation. Depending on the cause of action, legal
liability might turn either on a statement’s literal meaning or
on contextually determined implied meanings. And a few laws
of deception also impose legal default representations.
Although scholars have written volumes about the legal
interpretation of constitutions, statutes, contracts and other
types of legal speech acts, we still lack a complete
understanding of how interpretation works in the law of
deception. Different laws of deception employ different
approaches to interpretation. It is worth thinking
systematically about how and why.
Part III describes several ways in which laws of deception
reflect a commitment to both speaker and hearer autonomy.8
Section III.A examines the sorts of harms laws of deception are
designed to prevent or remedy. I distinguish four types: harms
to those deceived; harms to persons about whom a falsehood is
told; harms to honest market participants; and harms to the
communicative environment (which might not be a legally
cognizable harm). Understanding which harms a law of
deception targets is essential to determining how it should be
designed, as illustrated by some of the current confusion in the
area of securities fraud. Identifying legally salient harms is
also essential to determining an outer boundary for laws of
deception, as shown by the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Alvarez. 9 Alvarez’s application of the harm principle
8. I use “speaker” and “hearer” in this Essay as generic terms to refer
respectively to someone who performs a communicative act and to someone who
observes or receives that communication. Speakers in this technical and generic
sense can communicate through speech, writing, gestures and even meaningful
silences.
9. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).

KLASS_PAGEPROOFS_CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE)

104

11/20/2017 11:14 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

affirms the importance of speaker autonomy.
Section III.B examines the maxim that deception vitiates
consent, which appears in various guises in tort law, contract
law, the crime of rape, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Here there is a theoretical puzzle: it is difficult to say whether
tort cases invoking the maxim turn on the wrong of deception,
on the mistake that the deception causes, or on some mixture
of the two. There is also a practical problem: although there is
widespread agreement that not all deception vitiates consent, it
is not yet obvious where or how to draw the line. The recent
decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert illustrates
both the limits of current line-drawing strategies, and reasons
the law might sometimes permit deceptive manipulation. 10
Section III.C is also about consent, but comes at it from the
other side: Should the law empower parties to contract out of
liability for deceptive acts? In other words: Should the law
recognize consent to being deceived? Here I identify three
salient factors: the purpose of the law of deception, the type of
deceptive act or omission at issue, and whether there is a
reliable test for when parties have agreed to contract out. The
last factor reintroduces problems of interpretation. These
factors generate different answers for different laws of
deception.
The Essay as a whole suggests that individual freedom
figures into the law of deception in at least three ways. Legal
prohibitions on deception and the rule that fraud vitiates
consent are partly justified by the fact that deception interferes
with the autonomy of the deceived. Constitutional limits on
laws of deception derive in part from our polity’s commitment
to speaker autonomy. And a commitment to individual
autonomy further suggests that parties should sometimes have
the power to contract out of laws of deception.
This Essay’s approach is exploratory. I seek to identify
some important questions about laws of deception, not to
provide definitive answers to them. And these are not the only
questions one might ask. It would also be interesting to say
more about the various ways that reliance figures into different
laws of deception, the variety of scienter requirements, how the
law handles cases where it is difficult to verify whether a
statement is true or false, special procedural protections such
10.

No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS-EJF, 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah, July 7, 2017).
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as the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) or anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against
public participation) laws, differences between how the law
treats deception between private parties and deception of and
by the government, and of course remedies. That said, the
issues I discuss suffice to make the case for thinking about the
category as a whole.
As noted above, the major part of this Essay’s analysis
appears in Parts II and III. Before getting there, it is necessary
to say a few words about the idea that there is a distinctive
thing we might call the “law of deception.” This is the project of
Part I, which defines the object of study and discusses some
boundary issues.
I.

WHAT IS THE LAW OF DECEPTION?

I will use “deception” to mean an act or omission that
wrongfully causes a false belief in another. 11 The law of
deception comprises laws designed to prevent, punish,
compensate for, or otherwise address deception.
So defined, deception need not involve a lie, and not all lies
count as deception. A lie is a false statement made with
knowledge of the truth and with an intent to deceive. 12 A
negligent or innocent misrepresentation might be deceptive,
though it is not a lie. So too is a wrongful failure to correct
another’s false belief. Both constitute deception without lies.
Alternatively, a lie might have no chance of being believed.
Lies by small children are obvious examples, though there are
others. Such lies do not count as deception as I am using the
term.
It is sometimes difficult to disentangle deceptive acts from
deceptive omissions. A literally true statement, for example,
can deceive if it fails to include all the relevant information. In
a classic example, the seller of a piece of real estate might
mislead a buyer by disclosing that two roads are planned
nearby but not mentioning a third that will run through the
11. My definition is similar to Seana Shiffrin’s use of the term: “I propose . . .
that the wrong of deception, when it is wrong, properly focuses on the violation of
a duty to take due care not to cause another to form false beliefs based on one’s
behavior, communication, or omission.” SHIFFRIN, supra note 6, at 22.
12. This definition is somewhat narrower than Shiffrin’s conception of lying.
For Shiffrin, a liar need not intend that she be believed. Id. at 13. Shiffrin also
discusses the difference between lies and deception. Id. at 19–21.
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property. 13 In volunteering the information about the two
roads, the seller implicitly represents that she is sharing all the
relevant information on the subject. Such “half-truths” deceive
by saying too little rather than saying too much. Alternatively,
if a statement that the speaker believed to be true turns out to
be false, the speaker might have a duty to correct it. 14 Thus if
the seller of a mobile home park tells a buyer that the septic
system is in good condition and then learns of problems before
closing, the seller has a legal duty to share that information.15
Again, the deception happens through a combination of act and
omission. Finally, in some contexts, the law simply requires
disclosure, no matter what else is said. If the seller of a
residential home is aware of termite damage, she might have a
duty to share that information with the buyer—regardless of
what else she has said about the quality of the property. 16 The
above definition of “deception” includes both acts and omissions
so as to capture these and related phenomena.
Sometimes an act or omission causes a false belief, but we
hesitate to call it “deception.” I keep an umbrella in my office.
Suppose I use it to walk home in the rain Monday evening.
Tuesday morning, I bring the umbrella back to the office, and
my colleague Naomi sees me carrying it. Naomi knows that I
pay close attention to the forecast and mistakenly infers that I
have brought the umbrella because it is likely to rain. My act of
carrying the umbrella has caused Naomi to adopt a false belief.
But have I deceived her?
“Deception” is a word like any other. If we want to use it to
describe the relationship between my carrying the umbrella
and Naomi’s false belief, we can do that. But the category of
deceptive acts and omissions will then grow very large. Nor will
it bear a natural relation to behavior that the law does or
should target. I therefore use “deception” more narrowly to
designate behavior that violates some duty—moral, legal or
other. Causation alone is not enough. Deception is behavior
that wrongfully causes a false belief in another. As I am using
the term, I have not deceived Naomi by bringing the umbrella.
13. Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (N.Y. 1931).
14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1979).
15. Bergeron v. Dupont, 359 A.2d 627, 628 (N.H. 1976).
16. See, e.g., Piazzini v. Jessup, 314 P.2d 196, 198 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Pywell v. Haldane, 186 A.2d 623, 623–24 (D.C. 1962); Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d
188, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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I would deceive her if I carried the umbrella with the intent to
fool her, or if I had a duty to prevent her from drawing the false
inference.
It is also important to distinguish deception from
manipulation more generally—a boundary line that reveals
something important about why the law regulates deceptive
practices. I will follow the Oxford English Dictionary and say
that to manipulate another person is “to manage, control, or
influence [that person] in a subtle, devious, or underhand
manner.” 17 Intentional deception often seeks to manipulate
others. People lie to get others to do what they want. But not
all manipulation involves deception. Advertising and branding,
for example, can alter consumer preferences without inducing
in them any false beliefs. In blind taste tests people prefer the
taste of Pepsi to Coke, but in non-blind tests they prefer the
taste of Coke. 18 It appears that Coca-Cola has succeeded
through its advertising and branding campaigns in
manipulating consumers’ tastes and preferences. It is not
obvious, however, that in doing so Coca-Cola has caused
consumers to hold any false beliefs. It is possible to manipulate
without deceiving.
The law sometimes targets nondeceptive manipulation.
The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement prohibits cigarette
manufacturers from using “any Cartoon in the advertising,
promotion, packaging or labeling of Tobacco Products.” 19 That
rule does not target deception. It is unlikely that anyone ever
mistook Joe Camel for a real smoking dromedary. The purpose
is to prevent the manipulation of children’s preferences
through the use of images they are likely to find attractive.
Regulating private nondeceptive manipulation generates
difficult line-drawing problems. It is not surprising that the
above example involves children. We are disposed culturally
and politically to trust adults to make decisions for themselves,
even in the face of advertising and other attempts to affect
their choices or alter their preferences. And we are often
skeptical of state attempts to distinguish good preferences from
17. Manipulate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
18. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 513–14 (2008).
19. Master
Settlement
Agreement
19,
http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9QP-VWSB] (§ III(b)).
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bad. These cultural and political commitments to individual
autonomy can make it difficult to distinguish acceptable forms
of private nondeceptive persuasion from wrongful ones.20
Consequently, although we might not like private,
nondeceptive manipulation, 21 we rarely attach legal
consequences to it.
Deceptive manipulation presents an easier case. First,
intentional deception violates a familiar moral rule: Do not tell
a lie. Although the law of deception, as I have defined it,
captures more than lies, much of it can be justified by appeal to
that rule. 22 There is broad agreement that deceptive
manipulation is simply wrong. Second, folk psychology
suggests it is more difficult to guard against deception than
against other forms of manipulation. In Gulliver’s Travels,
Jonathan Swift famously depicts Lilliputian lawmakers’
reasoning as follows:
They look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and
therefore seldom fail to punish it with death; for they allege,
that care and vigilance, with a very common understanding,
may preserve a man’s goods from thieves, but honesty has
no defense against superior cunning; and, since it is
necessary that there should be a perpetual intercourse of
buying and selling, and dealing upon credit, where fraud is
permitted and connived at, or has no law to punish it, the
honest dealer is always undone, and the knave gets the
advantage. 23

20. For an autonomy-based argument against regulating private
manipulative speech, see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 362–65 (1991). For some thoughts on the
related but different question of state attempts to manipulate the choices people
make, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE 11–17 (2016).
21. Consider, for example, the recent controversy over Uber’s surreptitious
use of “psychological inducements and other techniques unearthed by social
science to influence when, where and how long drivers work.” Noam Scheiber,
How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-driverspsychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/QZ3S-B2M6]. Thanks to Ann Lipton
for suggesting the example.
22. Seana Shiffrin has, I think, done more than anyone else to tie various
laws of deception back to the moral obligation not to lie. See generally SHIFFRIN,
supra note 6.
23. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 48–49 (Arthur E. Case ed., The
Ronald Press Company 1938) (1726). Sissela Bok, in her work on the ethics of
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We are social creatures who cannot help but rely on
information we receive from others to navigate the world
around us. Deception thus strikes at the heart of the faculty of
reason, and so it is especially difficult to guard against. Third,
prohibiting deceptive behavior does not threaten the familiar
picture of legal subjects as autonomous and self-sufficient
agents. To respect autonomy is to allow individuals to
sometimes make bad choices. But a choice based on
misinformation is not fully autonomous, especially if the
misinformation was provided by someone attempting to
influence the recipient’s behavior. As David Strauss observes,
“lies that are told for the purpose of influencing behavior . . .
involve a denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere
with a person’s control over her own reasoning process.”24
Deception therefore threatens hearer autonomy in a way other
forms of manipulation do not. That fact is part of the
justification for laws of deception.
There exist large literatures discussing specific areas of
the law of deception. Scholars have written extensively on false
advertising law, securities law, the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, mandatory disclosure rules, and other laws of
deception. Most of these studies restrict themselves to a single
region of the law of deception. Parts II and III make the case
for thinking about the law of deception as a whole. Together
they identify four issues that reappear in multiple laws of
deception: interpretation, harm, the effect of deception on
consent, and consent to deception. These are not the only issues
that cut across the category. And I will not attempt to provide a
complete analysis of them. My aim is more modest: to convince
the reader of the value of thinking across traditional doctrinal
boundaries about the law of deception as a whole. Part II
lying, makes a similar point: “Both [deceit and violence] can coerce people into
acting against their will. . . . But deceit controls more subtly, for it works on belief
as well as action.” SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
LIFE 18 (1978).
24. Strauss, supra note 20, at 354. Or again:
The victim of a lie is denied that freedom. In making decisions, the
victim is pursuing the liar’s ends, not the victim’s own. Lying creates a
kind of mental slavery that is an offense against the victim’s humanity
for many of the reasons that physical slavery is. While it is hard to argue
that lying is worse than physical slavery, lying has a peculiarly offensive
quality because it denies the victim even the knowledge that he or she is
being used by another.
Id. at 354–55.
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discusses interpretation, Part III the other three issues, each of
which touches in its own way on autonomy interests.
II. INTERPRETATION
Laws of deception are often interpretive in the sense that
their application requires a fact finder to interpret what one or
both parties said or did. This Part explains why this is so,
identifies several varieties of interpretation one finds in laws of
deception, and discusses the choice between them.
A.

The Role of Interpretation in Laws of Deception

As I am using the term, an act or omission is deceptive
only if it causes a false belief in another. There are many
different types of causation, from the influence of one billiard
ball on another to the forces of history. In the case of deception,
causation often happens through communication. Thus a
simple case of deception might have the following structure:
A tells B proposition P;
As a result, B acquires a belief that P;
In fact P is not the case.

Not every form of deception fits this model. It does not
capture, for example, all cases of wrongful nondisclosure. But it
describes the basic communicative structure of many deceptive
acts.
Communication requires interpretation. A hearer
understands what a speaker says by interpreting the meaning
of the speaker’s words, acts or omissions. We might therefore
unpack the simple case as follows:
A utters sentence S to B;
B interprets S to mean that P;
As a result, B acquires a belief that P;
In fact P is not the case.

Sometimes to determine that a speaker’s utterance of a
sentence S means P, it is enough to understand S’s literal
meaning. If Naomi asks me, “Is the forecast for rain?” and I
reply, “No,” there appears little reason to read our exchange as
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saying anything other than the words’ literal meaning. In other
situations, people use words to say something other than or in
addition to their literal meanings. Obvious examples include
metaphor, irony and understatement. Implied meanings can
also supplement literal ones. If Naomi asks me, “Is the forecast
for rain?” and I reply, “No,” we almost certainly both
understand that we are talking about the local forecast in the
District of Columbia. If it later rains and I make the excuse
that I was speaking of the forecast for Flagstaff, Arizona,
Naomi might rightly complain that I spoke deceptively.
Implicit in our conversation, and my answer, was that we were
talking about the D.C. forecast.
All this might seem obvious. But it highlights the role
interpretation often plays in deception. Many laws of deception,
in turn, ask decision makers to interpret potentially deceptive
acts, with the aim of anticipating or reproducing the
understanding of a possibly deceived hearer. To succeed in an
action for the tort of deceit, for example, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant made “a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law.” 25 Proof of misrepresentation typically
requires demonstrating three separate facts:
1. D uttered S in circumstances y; 26
2. D’s uttering S in circumstances y meant P; and
3. P was not the case.

The first and third inquiries are factual ones. Establishing
the second requires that the fact finder interpret the
defendant’s words, actions or omissions. 27 This second inquiry
puts the tort of deceit in the broader category of interpretive
laws—laws whose application requires acts of interpretation.
B.

Varieties of Interpretation in the Law of Deception

To say that a law’s application involves interpretation is
not yet to say what sort of interpretation. Rules of
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
26. To keep things simple, the example assumes deception by false statement.
One might complicate things by replacing “uttered S” by “uttered S, committed
meaningful act A, or failed to O.”
27. In earlier work I have called the second step the “representation inquiry,”
and the third step the “veracity inquiry.” IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS,
INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 19–21 (2005).
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constitutional interpretation and construction differ from those
governing statutes, which differ from those that apply to
administrative regulations. One finds even more heterogeneity
in the private law. There is a marked difference, for example,
between the interpretive rules that apply to contractual
agreements and those that apply to the tort of deceit. 28 There is
also variety—and this is the central point of this Part—within
the law of deception.
Let us begin with the tort of deceit. When one looks in the
case law for rules of interpretation, at most one finds generic
statements such as:
The truth or falsity of representations for purposes of a
fraud claim is judged in the light of the meaning which the
plaintiffs would reasonably attach to them in existing
circumstances and the words employed must be considered
against the background and in the context in which they
were used. 29

As the passage suggests, the tort of deceit incorporates our
everyday, nonlegal, context-sensitive interpretive practices.
The meaning that matters is the meaning a reasonable person
would attribute the words in the circumstances. This explains
why the seller who tells the buyer of two planned roads might
commit deceit if she does not mention a third. 30 Even if the
statement is literally true, an ordinary hearer is likely to
understand it to imply that the speaker has disclosed all the
relevant information on the subject—that there is not a third
planned road.
This is not to say that the common law of deceit leaves fact
finders at sea when determining the meaning of what a
defendant said or did. The cases contain many judicial
observations on what constitutes puffery or sales talk, about
when a statement of opinion may be actionable, about how
half-truths can mislead, and on other interpretive questions. In
the end, however, the interpretive rule is one of
reasonableness: How in the circumstances should the
28. Klass, supra note 5, at 455–56.
29. Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 133 (Mo.
2010) (quoting Haberstick v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d
104, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
30. See supra p.5 (“road” hypothetical).
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defendant have expected the plaintiff to understand the
defendant’s words, acts and omissions? Common law actions for
deceit turn on the everyday, contextually determined
understandings of what was said.
Other laws of deception employ different rules of
interpretation. When applying the federal perjury statute, for
example, all that matters is the literal meaning of the witness’s
words. In Bronston v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered the following colloquy with the defendant in a
bankruptcy proceeding:
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months,
in Zurich. 31

Although it was true that the company had used a Swiss
bank account, the defendant also had opened a personal one.
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit
had upheld the defendant’s conviction for perjury based on the
jury’s finding that his nonresponsive answer was calculated to
deceive. “For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, an answer
containing half of the truth which also constitutes a lie by
negative implication, when the answer is intentionally given in
place of the responsive answer called for by a proper question,
is perjury.” 32 That outcome is consistent with the contextsensitive interpretive approach courts adopt in tort cases. 33
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. In reviewing the
exchange, the Court allowed that “in casual conversation [the
interpretation that the defendant had no personal account]
might reasonably be drawn.” 34 But despite the natural
understanding of the defendant’s answer, its tendency to
mislead, and a jury finding of intent to deceive, the Court held
31. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973).
32. United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d, 409
U.S. 352 (1973).
33. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“A
representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or
believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or
qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”).
34. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 357.
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that its literal truth was a complete defense.
[T]he perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the
statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in
derailing the questioner—so long as the witness speaks the
literal truth. The burden is on the questioner to pin the
witness down to the specific object of the questioner’s
inquiry. 35

Federal perjury prosecutions turn on the literal meaning of
the defendant’s words, largely excluding contextually
determined implied meanings.
Although the interpretive rules that attach to the federal
perjury statute and to the tort of deceit differ from one another,
both look to the nonlegal meaning of what the defendant said—
whether it is the meaning that can be found in a dictionary
(perjury) or in the full context of the statement (deceit). A few
laws of deception apply default legal representations, either
instead of or in addition to their other meanings. A legal
default is a meaning that attaches to an act not by virtue of
everyday understandings or conventional meanings, but by
virtue of a legal rule.
The tort of promissory fraud, for example, rests on the rule
that “a promise necessarily carries with it the implied assertion
of an intention to perform.” 36 Although based on conversational
norms, this is a legal default. The law automatically imputes to
every contractual promise the representation of an intent to
perform, unless the promisor says otherwise. Federal securities
law provides another example. In its 2015 decision in Omnicare
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension
Fund, the Supreme Court held that when an issuer makes a
35. Id. at 361.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See
also, e.g., Chedick v. Nash, 151 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is equally
plain that every party to a contract necessarily represents that it intends to
perform all its obligations, whether implicit or explicit.”); Old S. Life Ins. Co. v.
Woodall, 326 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 1976) (“When a promise is made the promisor
expressly or by necessary implication states that he then has a present intention
to perform.”); Cicone v. URS Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 887, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(“[A] promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to perform.”);
Berkeley Bank for Coops. v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) (“The promise
itself is regarded as a representation of a present intention to perform.”) (quoting
1 FOWLER VINCENT HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 571–72
(1956)).
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statement of belief in a registration statement, a reasonable
investor “expects not just that the issuer believes the opinion
(however irrationally), but that it fairly aligns with the
information in the issuer’s possession at the time.” 37 The Court
thereby attached to an issuer’s statement of belief a default
legal representation that the issuer has a reasonable basis for
that belief. 38 A third example can be found in judicial
applications of the federal False Claims Act (FCA). Under the
implied certification doctrine adopted by several circuits, a
government contractor’s request for payment implicitly
represents, as a matter of law, that the contractor is not in
material breach. 39 Again, the law attaches a default implied
representation.
In all these examples, the default corresponds to ordinary
practices. We do not generally expect a person to promise
without intending to perform, to have an opinion without a
reasonable basis for it, or to ask for a contract payment without
having performed. These legal rules, however, establish
noninterpretive defaults. A fact finder does not need to
interpret a promise to determine whether it represented an
intent to perform. The law tells her it does. Interpretation
comes in only if the defendant argues that the promise had a
non-default meaning.
These three types of rules—contextual conversational
interpretation, literal meaning interpretation, and default
representations—do not exhaust the ways laws of deception
seek out meaning. In false advertising and securities cases, for
example, courts have developed more complex interpretive
regimes involving a mix of these and other approaches. But the
simple examples are enough to show some of the variety among
the interpretive rules one finds in laws of deception.

37. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135
S. Ct. 1318, 1329 (2015).
38. See Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare,
Legal Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 772 (2016).
39. See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (overturned by
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016)); Ab-Tech
Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994). For a detailed account
of the implied certification doctrine, see Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied
Certification under the False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2011).
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Choosing an Interpretive Rule

That variety suggests several interesting questions. Most
obviously, why do laws of deception adopt the interpretative
approaches they do? Or to turn it around, what does the
interpretive approach of any given law of deception tell us
about that law? The answer might involve any of at least three
factors: the communicative environment, behavioral incentives,
and the law’s ability to affect how people speak.
First, the communicative environment is often salient. One
might argue, for example (though the Bronston opinion did
not), that the rules of ordinary conversation do not apply on the
witness stand. Conversation presupposes a degree of
cooperation that is often absent from testimonial exchanges.
Thus in the examination of a hostile witness, it might be
unreasonable to interpret a nonresponsive answer in light of
the question asked, and better to focus on the answer’s literal
meaning. The ordinary rules of conversational implicature do
not apply in this context.
Advertising is another example of a specialized
communicative environment. Because advertisements do not
involve a back-and-forth between the consumer and advertiser,
they do not allow for clarifications, qualifications or follow-ups
one finds in conversation. And though the relationship is not
adversarial in the way the examination of a hostile witness can
be, consumers are generally aware that advertisers seek to
influence their buying choices—that advertisers are not their
friends. These factors help explain why courts applying the
Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions sometimes eschew
interpretation of anything but an advertisement’s literal
meaning, and why when there are allegations of implicit
misrepresentation, courts often require empirical evidence of
consumer deception. 40
But the communicative environment is not the only
explanation for choice of interpretive rules. A second factor is
incentive effects.
The Bronston opinion, for example, emphasizes not the
adversarial context of testimonial examination, but the possible
deterrent effect of liability for implicit misrepresentations.
“[O]ne consideration of policy overshadowed all others during
40.

See Klass, supra note 5, at 466–69, 488–94.
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the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law offense:
‘that the measures taken against the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or
testifying.’” 41 Better, the court reasoned, to protect against
testimonial deception ex ante through a lawyer’s assiduous
examination at the time of the testimony than with ex post
penalties for false implicit meanings.
The incentives created by defaults are especially
interesting. A legal default representation can be used not only
to capture what most speakers mean most of the time, but also
to create new incentives for good behavior. The FCA’s implied
certification doctrine, for example, reinforces the maxim that
“[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government.” 42 The FCA imposes treble damages and per se
fines on contractors who misrepresent performance when they
request payment from the government. The default
representation of material compliance when seeking payment
therefore gives contractors a new reason to ensure material
compliance before requesting payment. The default addresses
not only what contractors say, but also what they are expected
to do.
Along the same lines, consider the practical effect of the
Omnicare rule that a stock issuer’s expression of belief in a
registration statement implies a reasonable basis for that
belief. Hilary Sales and Donald Langevoort have argued that
the default incentivizes corporate directors to inquire into the
existence and basis for such statements before signing off on a
filing. The default thereby serves to reinforce and even extend
directors’ fiduciary obligations to shareholders. 43 Again, the
default representation can affect underlying behavior by giving
actors a new reason to ensure that it is true.
Third, legal interpretive rules can be designed to affect not
only how people behave, but also how they speak and how they
understand one another. The literal-truth rule for perjury does
more than insulate witnesses against prosecution. It gives the
examiner a new reason to avoid ambiguity and to ensure that
41. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (quoting Study of
Perjury, reprinted in Report of New York Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc.
No. 60, at 249 (1935)).
42. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143
(1920).
43. Sale & Langevoort, supra note 38 at 790–95.
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she receives a clear answer to her question. The rule of
interpretation thereby shifts regulation away from ex post
punishment and toward ex ante observation and correction.
How much a legal rule influences how people communicate
depends on the circumstances. In the contexts of government
contracting, the sale of securities, and questioning of witnesses
under oath, participants are likely to be highly attuned to their
words’ legal effects. The tort of deceit, in distinction, covers
contexts in which speakers and hearers are unlikely to be
thinking about the relevant legal interpretive rule. We want
and expect people in everyday commercial transactions to be
able to rely on the ordinary, contextually determined meanings
of their words. The tort of deceit therefore applies interpretive
rules that mirror those of hearers, rather than trying to alter
them.
* * *
Before leaving the topic, it is worth emphasizing that not
all laws of deception require interpretation for their
application. I have already mentioned disclosure obligations.
When the buyer of a residential home claims that the seller
failed to disclose termite damage, the preliminary question is
not the meaning of what the seller said, but whether she said
anything at all to put the buyer on notice of a termite problem.
Nondisclosure is only one example of noninterpretive laws of
deception. If the seller of a ship takes it out of dry dock and
puts it in the water to hide its rotting hull, an action for
concealment will turn not on the meaning of the ship owner’s
words or actions, but on the reason for floating the ship. 44 And
even where words are used to deceive, a law might instruct
decision makers to use noninterpretive tools to determine their
effect. Thus, as noted above, the Lanham Act sometimes
requires empirical studies of an ad’s effects on consumer
beliefs, rather than utilizing a fact finder’s assessment of its
best interpretation. Laws of deception not only employ various
interpretive rules, but sometimes eschew or supplement
interpretation.

44. See Schneider v. Heath, 170 Eng. Rep. 1462, 1462–63 (Ct. Com. Pls. 1813);
Klass, supra note 5 at 460–65.
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III. DECEPTION AND AUTONOMY
I argued in Part I that laws of deception are justified in
part by the fact that deception interferes with a hearer’s
autonomy. This Part discusses three clusters of issues, each of
which touches in its own way on our political culture’s
commitment to individual autonomy: the harms that laws of
deception address; when deception does and does not prevent
legally effective consent; and parties’ ability to contract out of a
law of deception.
A.

The Harms of Deception and Speaker Autonomy

Another way of dividing up laws of deception (in addition
to categorizing them by interpretive rules) is according to the
harm a law addresses. As a starting place, consider the
difference between deceit and defamation. The tort of deceit is
designed to protect the recipient or hearer of a false statement
from acting on false information. The plaintiff is a hearer and
must prove both reliance and resulting injury. 45 Defamation, in
contrast, is designed to protect the subject of a falsehood. The
plaintiff is not a hearer who was deceived, but the subject of
the falsehood whose reputation was thereby harmed. The
plaintiff must show not that she relied on the falsehood, but
that others were likely to believe it to her detriment. 46
Alternatively or in addition, a law of deception might be
designed to protect honest market participants from the
competitive harms caused by dishonesty. A competitor’s
deceptive business practices can harm honest businesses in two
ways. The deceptive practices can draw customers away from
those who do not engage in deception. And they can erode trust
more generally, creating a market for lemons and driving down
prices. 47 Thus in the United States the earliest pushes for laws
against false advertising came not from consumers or consumer
protection groups, but from the business community. As
historian Edward Balleisan explains, national businesses
“create[d] a series of nonprofit business organizations between
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
46. See 3 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 519 (2d ed. 2011).
47. When buyers cannot trust sellers’ statements of quality, they assume all
goods are of low quality, and so are willing to pay only the price for low-quality
goods. In such a “market for lemons,” it does not pay to sell high-quality goods.
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the mid-1890s and early 1920s, all primarily dedicated to
rooting out fraud in the American marketplace.” 48 These
organizations both engaged in private campaigns against false
advertising and partnered with government enforcers. That
history partly explains why contemporary false advertising law
so heavily relies on competitor suits under the Lanham Act.
Finally, a law of deception might not take aim at concrete
harms, but instead seek to underwrite credible communication
in one or another forum more generally or to punish specific
types of lies. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which criminalizes
knowingly and willfully “mak[ing] any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” to a
government official. 49 The statute does not require that the
government official believe or act upon the false statement.50
Suppose, for example, a criminal investigator asks a suspect
about a crime that the investigator knows the suspect
committed, and the suspect predictably denies having
committed it. Lisa Kern Griffin has compared such exculpatory
lies to puffery—a falsehood that no one would believe or rely
on. “The natural reaction of most subjects confronted by
investigators is to respond in a way that deflects scrutiny and
forestalls liability—a reaction that agents generally
anticipate.” 51 Yet the lie can be prosecuted under section 1001.
The absence of a reliance requirement suggests that the law
seeks not to prevent the harms of deception, but to enforce a
more general duty of truthfulness when dealing with
government officials. “Although on its face the statute protects
the accuracy of the information that individuals convey to the
government, the desire for efficiency, the assertion of authority,
and a preoccupation with apology better explain charging
decisions.” 52
Together these examples indicate at least four broad
functions that laws of deception might serve. A law of deception
might be designed to protect those who might be deceived; to
protect those about whom a deceptive statement is made; to
48. BALLEISEN, supra note 6, at 179.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2017).
50. Thus in Brogan v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to limit the
crime to “falsehoods that pervert governmental functions.” 522 U.S. 398, 402
(1998).
51. Lisa Kern Griffith, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social
Meaning, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1520 (2009).
52. Id. at 1533.
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prevent honest market participants from unfair competition by
dishonest ones; and to promote honesty or punish dishonesty in
specific communicative contexts, whether or not the deception
results in concrete harms. These purposes are not mutually
exclusive. Contemporary false advertising and trademark laws,
for example, aim both to protect consumers from being deceived
and to protect honest business from unfair competition. And
criminal fraud laws might aim both to prevent harms to
victims and to exact retribution on wrongdoers.
It is sometimes uncertain just what type of harm a law of
deception is meant to address. The law governing private 10b-5
actions for securities fraud is an example. 53 On some accounts,
the cause of action is designed to compensate the victims of
securities fraud—those who, in reliance on the deceptive acts,
bought high or sold low. Thus the 10b-5 plaintiff must show
inter alia reliance, causation and materiality. 54 On other
accounts, the purpose of the 10b-5 action is not to compensate
the plaintiffs, but to police the integrity of the market as a
whole. On this model, plaintiffs function as private attorneys
general, deterring companies from engaging in securities fraud.
The award is not so much to compensate the plaintiff for her
loss as to reward her, and her attorney, for bringing the
enforcement action, and to incentivize others to do the same. 55
The difference between these accounts is important when
it comes to thinking about the rules for class actions. Not every
buyer or seller of stocks will have encountered or relied on the
act or omission at issue in a securities fraud case. This can
make it difficult to satisfy the commonality requirement for a
class action. 56 The Supreme Court addressed this worry in
1988 in Basic v. Levinson by establishing a presumption that
market participants buy or sell stock not in reliance on
particular representations, but on the assumption that its price
is not generally distorted by prohibited misrepresentations or
53. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-theMarket Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755 (2013).
54. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
55. Goldberg and Zipursky argue that neither of these accounts succeeds, and
propose a third. According to them, private 10b-5 actions that employ the fraudon-the-market presumption aim to compensate plaintiffs for non-reliance-based
harms that misrepresentations cause. The cause of action is therefore
fundamentally different from the tort of deceit, and better understood by
comparison to the torts of negligence causing loss and tortious interference with
prospective advantage. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 53, at 1799–1803.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
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omissions. 57 That presumption provides to the class shared
forms of reliance and causation.
Basic’s theory of fraud on the market has, in years since,
generated a host of further questions. 58 Most importantly: How
and when do issuer misstatements or nondisclosures affect
stock prices? And do investors really assume that they have
perfect information when they buy and sell? As Don
Langevoort has observed: “Fraud and manipulation are
predictable enough that it would be foolish for anyone simply to
assume that a stock price has integrity. In an efficient market,
the inevitable risk of fraud is priced and investors are
compensated for taking on the risk—the market is not
assuming its absence.” 59
If the empirical basis for the fraud-on-the-market
presumption is shaky, whether or not to keep it depends on the
purpose of the 10b-5 action—whether it is meant to compensate
investors for actual losses, or to incentivize private attorneys
general to help ensure the integrity of the informational
market. On the former model, questions about the price effects
of disinformation and how market participants make buy and
sell decisions are essential. If it turns out such questions are
difficult to answer for any tractable class of plaintiffs, so much
the worse for class actions. On the latter model, the design
question shifts to the optimal level of enforcement. If the goal is
to reward enterprising lawyers who act as private attorneys
general, the question is not whether Basic’s fraud-on-themarket presumption is true, but whether it provides the right
reward structure.
The above discussion required going fairly deep into the
securities-fraud weeds, but the point is a simple one: form
should follow function. The proper design of any law of
deception depends on the type of harm or harms the law is
meant to address.
Harm is also relevant to constitutional issues, adding
another dimension to the relation between laws of deception
and individual autonomy. In United States v. Alvarez, 60 the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Stolen
57. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
58. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud
on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151.
59. Id. at 160 (footnote omitted).
60. 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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Valor Act of 2005, which criminalized falsely claiming to have
received a military decoration. 61 In 2007, Xavier Alvarez falsely
stated at a local water board meeting that he was a retired
Marine and had been awarded the Congressional Medal of
Honor. 62 These statements were not made for the purpose of
securing a material benefit and apparently harmed no one—if
they were even believed. But because the lie concerned the
Congressional Medal of Honor, Alvarez was prosecuted under
the Stolen Valor Act, which provided for a punishment of up to
a year in prison.
The Supreme Court held that Alvarez’s prosecution, and
the Stolen Valor Act as a whole, violated the First Amendment.
Although the decision was not unanimous, each of the three
opinions focused on the question of harm. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the plurality, emphasized that the Court’s prior
statements that falsehoods receive no First Amendment
protection had all occurred in “cases discussing defamation,
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with
false statements.” 63 Justice Breyer, in concurrence, similarly
observed that when a statute prohibiting falsehoods escapes
First Amendment scrutiny, it is because “requirements of proof
of injury, and the like, narrow the statute to a subset of lies
where specific harm is more likely to occur.” 64 Accordingly,
both Kennedy and Breyer suggested that the Act might have
complied with the First Amendment if it had required “a
showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at
least was material, or focus[ed] its coverage on lies most likely
to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely to
cause harm.” 65 Justice Alito, writing in dissent, did not dispute
61. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012), invalidated by United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (plurality opinion).
62. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713–14.
63. Id. at 718.
64. Id. at 736 (Breyer, J., concurring).
[M]any statutes and common-law doctrines make the utterance of
certain kinds of false statements unlawful. Those prohibitions, however,
tend to be narrower than the statute before us, in that they limit the
scope of their application, sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm
to identifiable victims; sometimes by specifying that the lies be made in
contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur;
and sometimes by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are
particularly likely to produce harm.
Id. at 734.
65. Id. at 738; see also id. at 723 (plurality opinion) (“Where false claims are

KLASS_PAGEPROOFS_CLEAN (DO NOT DELETE)

124

11/20/2017 11:14 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

the major premise of the Kennedy and Breyer opinions—that
constitutionality turned on harm. Instead Alito argued that lies
about military honors in fact “inflict substantial harm,”
sometimes tangible, as when they are used to secure material
benefits, and more generally by debasing the award and
undermining the credibility of truthful claims. 66 In short, all
three opinions in Alvarez agreed that prohibiting harmless lies
violates the First Amendment.
I observed at the end of Part I that in our political culture
laws prohibiting deceptive manipulation are easier to justify
than laws prohibiting nondeceptive manipulation because of
the way deception interferes with hearer autonomy. Alvarez
illustrates another boundary line: we are more comfortable
prohibiting harmful deception than we are prohibiting
harmless lies. That line corresponds to John Stuart Mill’s harm
principle: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.” 67 The harm principle, in
turn, is founded on a liberal commitment to personal
autonomy, here speaker autonomy. Autonomy therefore figures
into both the justification for laws of deception and the limits
we put on those laws. Laws of deception are justified, at least
in part, because deception undermines hearer autonomy. At
the same time, our commitment to speaker autonomy leads us
to generally limit those laws to cases of harmful deception, as
distinguished from harmless lies.
As the opinions in Alvarez illustrate, the line between
harmful and harmless deception is not a bright one. And the
judicial application of section 1001 suggests that sometimes we
are comfortable punishing the harmless lie. The point is not
that a commitment to speaker autonomy provides a fixed limit
on laws of deception, but that it is an important consideration
when evaluating them.

made to effect a fraud, or secure moneys or other valuable consideration, say
offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may restrict
speech without affronting the First Amendment.”).
66. Id. at 742–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
67. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859). Mill himself, of course, deployed the harm principle in his
defense of freedom of speech.
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Deception and Consent

The relationship between the law of deception and
autonomy can also be seen in the effect of deception on what
would otherwise be legally effective consent.
It is commonly said that fraud vitiates consent, 68 or in
another formulation: “[C]onsent obtained on the basis of
deception is no consent at all.” 69 Such statements are often
found in torts cases. For example, if B permits A to enter B’s
home because A has misrepresented that she is a meter reader,
A has committed trespass, even though B has apparently
consented to the entry. 70 If A induces B to agree to a touching
by falsely representing that A is a physician, A has committed
battery, despite B’s apparent consent to the touching.71
Analogous rules can be found in contract law, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and rape law.
It is something of an open question how best to explain the
rule that fraud vitiates consent. One could begin with the
principle that no one shall benefit from her own wrong—nullus
commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. 72 The wrong in
these cases is the defendant’s deceptive conduct. The rule that
fraud vitiates consent prevents the defendant from benefitting
from that wrong. That result comports with our moral sense.
And it disincentivizes engaging in the deception in the first
place.
There is, however, an alternative explanation. The rule in
tort does not require misrepresentation by the defendant. It is
enough, according to the Second Restatement of Torts, that
“the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to
consent by a substantial mistake . . . and the mistake is known
to the other.” 73 The mistake prong suggests another
explanation: the rule that fraud vitiates consent is not so much
about the wrong of deception as it is about the quality of the
consent. When apparent consent to an invasive act is based on
a substantial mistake, it is not truly voluntary and therefore
not actual consent. If the invader is unaware of the mistake,
68.
69.
70.
71.
1957).
72.
73.

See, e.g., Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Wis. 1974).
McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 58, 61 (D.C. 1968).
State v. Donahue, 762 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
See, e.g., Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of Am., 243 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir.
Famously applied in Neiman v. Hurff, 993 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1952).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892B(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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the appearance of consent provides something like a defense to
the tort. That defense is not available, however, if the invader
knows of the mistake. On this account, fraud vitiates consent
not because the fraud is a wrong, but because one who
fraudulently induces apparent consent knows that the consent
is defective.
Either account suffices to explain the rule. A third draws
the two explanations together to provide an even stronger case
for it, and returns us to an idea from Part I. When A obtains
B’s consent through deception, it is not just that B’s consent is
defective and A knows it. A has intentionally and
surreptitiously caused B’s apparent consent. B has, in this
respect, fallen under A’s control. B’s decision is not autonomous
(self-governed) but heteronomous (governed by another).
Consent obtained through deception is even less autonomous
than consent based on other sorts of mistake. The consenting
party is under the sway of the deceiver.
It is not obvious that we need to decide between these
three accounts of the rule that fraud vitiates consent. They
may complement rather than compete with one another. There
is, however, a more pressing practical problem: defining the
rule’s proper limits.
Richard Posner, writing for the court in Desnick v.
American Broadcasting Company, has explained why the rule
cannot possibly apply to all deceptive behavior. Without
exceptions to it,
a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he
ordered a meal, or a browser pretend to be interested in
merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests
would be trespassers if they were false friends who never
would have been invited had the host known their true
character, and a consumer who in an effort to bargain down
an automobile dealer falsely claimed to be able to buy the
same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a trespasser in
the dealer’s showroom. 74

In all these cases the deception induces the consent. Had
the consenting person known the truth, she would not have
consented to the deceiver’s presence. Yet we hesitate to identify
74.

Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995).
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them as instances of trespass—at least in the sense that they
warrant legal intervention.
The above examples might be dismissed as involving de
minimis forms of deception. But courts have found exceptions
to the rule even when the deception is more substantial. Two
circuits have held that journalists do not commit trespass when
they misrepresent who they are in order to gain access to a
business. 75 In the Fourth Amendment context, a drug suspect’s
consent to a warrantless entry is effective even if induced by a
police officer’s false claim that he is a customer seeking to
purchase drugs, 76 though if an officer misrepresents that he
has a warrant the consent is not effective. 77 And in most U.S.
jurisdictions, the criminal law recognizes only two types of
deception that negates consent to sex: a false representation
that the sexual act is a medical procedure and impersonation of
a spouse. 78 Thus a man who misrepresents himself to be his
twin brother to obtain his brother’s girlfriend’s consent to
sexual intercourse might not commit sexual misconduct, even
though the consent was clearly defective. 79
It is not obvious that there is a single line running through
all these different rules. The exceptions to the rule that fraud
vitiates consent are narrower in the Fourth Amendment and
criminal law contexts than they are in tort law. And though
deception can serve as a defense to contract 80—fraud vitiates
the deceived party’s agreement to the exchange—it is not
obvious that there are any exceptions to the defense analogous
to the exceptions in tort, Fourth Amendment law, or criminal
law.
With respect to trespass, Posner suggests that fraud
vitiates consent only when the invasion infringes on interests
that the law is designed to protect. Desnick v. American
Broadcasting considered a news organization’s use of test
patients with concealed cameras to investigate whether an
ophthalmic clinic was performing unnecessary procedures.
Posner explained that there was no trespass because “there
75. Id. at 1353; Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities / ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 518
(4th Cir. 1999).
76. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
77. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
78. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1397 (2013).
79. People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. 1994).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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was no invasion . . . of any of the specific interests that the tort
of trespass seeks to protect.” 81 The test patients did not disrupt
the clinic’s activities; there was no invasion of privacy; there
was no eavesdropping or publicity of private facts; there was no
theft of trade secrets or disruption of the peace. In short, “the
entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of
interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it
was not an interference with the ownership or possession of
land.” 82 Consequently, the test patients’ fraud did not vitiate
the clinic’s consent to their entry.
There are problems with the line Posner suggests. For one
thing, it presumes that courts can identify the types of
interests that the law of trespass protects. Thinking about the
question in the abstract, one might include on the list a
property owner’s power to exclude from the property whomever
she wishes. But such a list would be incompatible with the
Desnick holding. The test patients’ deception denied the clinic
the knowledge it needed to exercise its power to exclude. One
might also wonder whether Posner’s analysis proves too much.
If there is no invasion of interests that the law of trespass
protects, perhaps consent—defective or not—should not make a
difference. We should get the same result if the test patients
had simply snuck into the clinic to film it.
Finally, it is difficult to ignore that the Desnick defendant
was a news organization trying to expose an eye clinic that was
performing unnecessary surgeries. Most of Posner’s examples
of non-vitiating deception involve socially accepted and even
beneficial misrepresentations—a restaurant critic’s disguise,
antidiscrimination testers’ misrepresented purpose, undercover
reporting. Perhaps some of these cases turn as much on the
social value of the deception as on the nature of the
infringement. Where the deception is not a wrong, the law
permits the deceiver to benefit from it. Or to put the point in
the terms from above: the wrongdoing hearer in these cases
does not have an autonomy interest that the law protects. The
law in effect authorizes some forms of private deceptive
manipulation. 83
81. Desnick v. Am. Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995).
82. Id. at 1353.
83. Ian Ayres and I have made a similar point about why a lying promise to
commit a crime should not be punished. See AYRES & KLASS, supra note 27, at
158–61.
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A recent District Court decision further illustrates the
competing interests in these cases. Animal Legal Defense Fund
(hereinafter
“ALDF”)
addressed
the
v.
Herbert84
constitutionality of Utah’s ag-gag law, whose section 2(b)
criminalized “obtain[ing] access to an agricultural operation
under false pretenses.” 85 The ag-gag law was designed to
prevent undercover investigations, by the press and by animal
rights advocates, of agricultural operations. The plaintiffs—
animal rights organizations and an individual who had been
wrongly charged under the law—argued that it violated the
First Amendment.
ALDF is interesting in the context of this Essay because
the court’s analysis of section 2(b) appears to pit the speaker’s
autonomy interests against the hearer’s. The District Court
began its analysis with Alvarez, reading the Supreme Court’s
decision to entail that “if any of the lies prohibited by the Act
do not cause legally cognizable harm, those lies are protected
under the First Amendment and the lying provision of the Act
criminalizing them is subject to scrutiny.” 86 Among the possible
harms that an investigator’s lies might cause is trespass: the
investigator has gained access to the agricultural operation by
misrepresenting who she is or what she intends to do when
there. The District Court then based its analysis of the
potential harm on Posner’s Desnick analysis: “[I]f the liar does
not interfere with ownership or possession of the land, [the
landowner’s] consent to access the property remains valid,
notwithstanding that it was obtained nefariously through
misrepresentation.” 87 Because section 2(b) was written so as to
criminalize merely gaining access to the property, the court
concluded that it criminalized harmless lies—lies that,
according to Alvarez, receive First Amendment protection.88
From there it was a short step to concluding that the law was a
form of content-based regulation, subjecting it to strict
scrutiny, which the provision failed to pass. 89
There is a lot going on in ALDF. Here I make only three
observations. First, because of ALDF’s procedural posture—the
84. No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS, 2017 WL 2912423 (D. Utah, July 7, 2017).
85. Agricultural Operation Interference, Utah Code § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2017),
invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund, 2017 WL 2912423, at *15.
86. Herbert, 2017 WL 2912423, at *6.
87. Id. at *7 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at *9.
89. Id. at *12–13, *14–15.
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plaintiffs were animal rights activists bringing a facial
challenge to the law—it was enough to find a possible
application that would violate the First Amendment. As the
court observed, the case “might seem to involve a weighing of
the value of undercover investigations against the wisdom and
reasoning behind laws suppressing them.” 90 But “because of
both the breadth of the Act and the narrow grounds on which
the State defended it,” those issues were never fully litigated. 91
Second, this leaves open the question of whether a more
narrowly tailored law—one, say, that criminalized not merely
entering the land, but engaging in activities that the owner
clearly objected to—would violate the First Amendment. Such
a law would strain the boundaries of Posner’s approach.
Whereas a common law court can invoke its own judgment as
to what interests trespass does or does not protect, a narrowly
drawn statute would answer the question for the court. Third,
all this suggests that the First Amendment does not get at
what is really worrisome about these laws. The real question is
whether, where there is evidence that an agricultural producer
is engaging in animal cruelty, the law should recognize its
autonomy interest in being free from a deceptive intrusion.
This, of course, is a policy question—one that the First
Amendment might not answer.
C.

Consent to Deception

One might also ask whether parties should be able to
contract out of laws of deception—to legally consent to being
deceived. For any given law of deception, we can ask whether it
should be a default or a mandatory rule—whether parties
should or should not be able to opt out of it. A commitment to
freedom of contract generally means enforcing the terms
parties choose. If, absent prior agreement, deception threatens
hearer autonomy, the power to contract out of a law of
deception would seem to expand party autonomy.
Just when parties should be able to contract out of a law of
deception depends on at least three factors: the law’s purpose,
how wrongful the deceptive behavior is, and availability of
effective mechanisms of consent.

90.
91.

Id. at *14.
Id.
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The first factor is the law’s purpose, and especially the
types of harms it is designed to address. It would be odd, for
example, to allow participants in a judicial proceeding to
contract out of the law of perjury. Perjury exists not to serve
the individuals in a courtroom, but society’s interests in the
integrity of judicial proceedings and accurate adjudicative
outcomes. Giving participants the ability to contract out of
liability for false testimony would not advance those purposes,
but undermine them.
The ability to opt out seems less problematic with respect
to other laws of deception. Consider a multimillion-dollar
corporate acquisition, in which the written agreement includes
a list of carefully negotiated, legally binding representations.
The parties to such a transaction, or their lawyers, might
reasonably worry that statements made during the solicitation
or negotiations might create a risk of tort liability or
contractual defenses, thereby introducing uncertainty into a
transaction and occasions for opportunism or judicial error.
Here it appears more reasonable to empower the parties to
limit their liability for at least some potentially deceptive acts.
If the purpose of the rules is to protect the parties, why not
allow sophisticated parties to agree to forgo their protections?
But would we want such parties to be able to contract out
of legal liability for any deceptive act? A second relevant factor
is the nature of the deceptive act or omission. We might want,
for example, to permit sophisticated parties to contract out of
liability for negligent misrepresentations, but not for
intentional ones. Such a rule would accord with the Second
Restatement of Contracts, which states that parties can
contract out of liability for negligence and adopt reasonable
terms “exempting a party from the legal consequences of a
misrepresentation,” 92 but suggests that any “term exempting a
party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or
recklessly is unenforceable.” 93 Thus, to return to the above
example, we might want to empower parties to a corporate
acquisition to limit liability for negligent misrepresentations
made during the solicitation and negotiation periods, but not
for intentional misrepresentations. Similarly, we might want to
empower principals to contract out of tort liability for

92.
93.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Id. § 195(1).
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misrepresentations by their agents, including liability for
fraudulent misrepresentations, but not for their own lies. 94
A third factor is whether there exists a reliable mechanism
for determining when a party has agreed to no liability for
deception. 95 Consider, for example, false advertising law.
Assuming arguendo that we wanted to allow consumers to opt
out of its protections, perhaps in exchange for a lower price, it
is not obvious how the opt-out would work. Would it be enough
for an advertiser to print or say somewhere in the
advertisement, “No legal guarantee of truthfulness”? Would all
consumers pay attention to such legal language? Would all
consumers understand it the same way?
Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act provides a nice example for thinking about the
design problem. The Act provides that a consumer has the
power to waive its protections, but only if “(1) the waiver is in
writing and is signed by the consumer; (2) the consumer is not
in a significantly disparate bargaining position; and (3) the
consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or
acquiring the goods or services.” 96 The law further provides
that the consumer’s counsel must be independent of the
business and that the waiver must be
(1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in
size; (2) identified by the heading “Waiver of Consumer
Rights,” or words of similar meaning; and (3) in
substantially the following form: “I waive my rights under
the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,
Section 17.41 et seq., Business & Commerce Code, a law
that gives consumers special rights and protections. After
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1958). But
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. c(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(suggesting that such an exculpatory clause for an agent’s fraudulent
misrepresentations is not effective when the principal knows or has reason to
know that the agent is likely to misrepresent, but that notification that the agent
does not have authority to bind the principal through certain representations
could be).
95. In the parlance of contract theory, every default comes with an altering
rule. An altering rule specifies who must say what and in what manner to realize
a nondefault legal state of affairs. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). If parties can
contract out of a law of deception, that law is a mere default. The question, then,
is what the altering rule should be.
96. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (West 2017).
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consultation with an attorney of my own selection, I
voluntarily consent to this waiver.” 97

The reasons for all these requirements are fairly obvious:
to ensure that the consumer’s waiver is informed and fully
voluntary. So too are their costs in time, effort and attorney’s
fees. One might guess that few if any consumers are likely to
exercise their power to opt out of the Act’s protections. In
practice, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act is probably an all but mandatory rule.
Effective and accurate mechanisms of consent are easier to
imagine in bespoke transactions between legally sophisticated
parties. Thus the Delaware Chancery Court has held that a
simple exculpatory clause in a stock purchase agreement
insulated
the
seller
against
any
negligent
98
misrepresentations. And sophisticated parties in securities
markets regularly issue “big boy” letters to insulate themselves
from liability for nondisclosure. 99 The power to opt out of a law
of deception requires an effective way to knowingly exercise
that power. Whether to allow parties to legally consent to being
deceived depends both on principle and on practicality.
* * *
Although this Part has emphasized the different ways that
a commitment to individual autonomy figures into the law of
deception, I do not want to make too much of the point. Laws of
deception are about more than autonomy. They also serve inter
alia to prevent financial and other harms, to establish and
enforce morals of the marketplace, to compensate for wrongful
losses, to punish wrongdoers, and to increase overall welfare.
But our political culture’s commitment to autonomy figures
into the outlines of the law of deception in distinctive and
important ways.
CONCLUSION
The above tour through a few regions of the law of
deception suggests something of its common geography. And I
97. Id. § 17.42(b)–(c).
98. ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisitions LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035
(Del. Ch. 2006).
99. See Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside
Information, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 135 (2008).
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hope it has convinced the reader of the advantage of thinking
about the category as a whole. Although my goal has not been
to advance any big theses about the law of deception, two broad
areas of inquiry have emerged. The first concerns rules of
interpretation. Although much work has been done on the
interpretation of legal texts, very little has been done on how
interpretation works in laws of deception. There is room for
additional research in this area. The second is the complex
relationship between laws of deception and individual
autonomy. Because deception interferes with hearer autonomy,
we are more comfortable regulating it than we are other forms
of manipulation, and deception sometimes vitiates what would
otherwise be legally effective consent. At the same time, a
commitment to speaker autonomy limits the regulation of
harmless lies. Finally, a commitment to autonomy suggests
that parties should sometimes be able to opt out of protections
that the law of deception otherwise provides.
The above discussion does not cover all the questions one
might ask about the law of deception. I have not systematically
discussed
materiality
rules,
knowledge
and
intent
requirements, disclosure requirements or remedies. Nor have I
addressed special procedural rules that attach to laws of
deception, such as Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading or antiSLAPP laws. Also important are broader design questions,
such as whether the law should rely on ex ante oversight or ex
post punishment, or the relationship between legal and
nonlegal norms. I hope it is enough to convince, however, the
value to legal theorists of thinking about the law of deception
as a whole. Thinking across the traditional doctrinal lines both
suggests new answers to existing questions we might have
about laws of deception and suggests new ones.

